Cryptography Meets Game Theory: A Match For Fair Exchange
Abstract#
Fair exchange is one of the most fundamental human-to-human activity in a society. In a simple case, we have two users Alice and Bob, where Alice has a commodity A, and Bob has a commodity B that they want to exchange. While fairness has several definitions, the one we will focus on is: If and only if, Alice gets commodity B, Bob gets commodity A. Assuming a trusted third party solves the exchange, however, it introduces new problems of centralized trust. On the other hand, Cleve’86 showed that the above notion of fairness is impossible in the absence of an honest majority of parties. Many academic works since then have relaxed the notion of fairness using game-theoretic incentives for the involved parties. Recently, with the advent of blockchains, we have solutions that allow a fair exchange between a buyer’s payment and a seller’s digital good. While such an exchange is the fundamental operation for a functioning economy, the current solutions are still lacking due to various issues like poor privacy, efficiency, and limited compatibility.
In this talk, we will see how to overcome these issues and challenges using novel cryptographic tools. Specifically, we will learn about adaptor signatures that allow for an efficient solution for fair payments between a buyer and a seller, with better privacy and compatibility. We will also see how to expand the functionality of adaptor signatures to support more applications of fine-grained information sales.