

Propositions and Types, Proofs and Programs

Part V: Extensions

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Gödel's System T

We mentioned previously that we would like our base types to include useful types such as Bool and Nat.

- Including introduction and elimination rules
- System T extends STLC with exactly these types

These types are not interesting from a traditional logical point of view

- Logically equivalent to each other, and to any other theorem, e.g. $\perp \rightarrow \perp$
- But logical equivalence does not imply isomorphism
- This is the **proof relevant** view of logic which cares about which proofs inhabit each type, not mere inhabitation.

Booleans

Introduction and elimination:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{True}:\text{Bool}} \qquad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{False}:\text{Bool}}$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash b:\text{Bool} \quad \Gamma \vdash t:C \quad \Gamma \vdash u:C}{\Gamma \vdash \text{if } b \text{ then } t \text{ else } u:C}$$

Reduction rules:

- $\text{if True then } t \text{ else } u \mapsto t$ and $\text{if False then } t \text{ else } u \mapsto u$

Booleans Discussed

We can therefore write programs with Booleans like

- $\lambda x^{\text{Bool}}. \text{if } x \text{ then False else True}$
- $\lambda x^{\text{Bool}}. \lambda y^{\text{Bool}}. \text{if } x \text{ then } y \text{ else False}$

We could instead encode Bool in STLC

- $(\theta \rightarrow \theta) + (\theta \rightarrow \theta)$
- True as $\iota^1(\lambda x^\theta. x)$ and False as $\iota^2(\lambda x^\theta. x)$
- if...then...else left as an exercise

But Nat, which is not finite, will require us to go beyond STLC

Natural Numbers

Introduction and elimination:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{zero}:\text{Nat}} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash n:\text{Nat}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{suc } n:\text{Nat}}$$
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash n:\text{Nat} \quad \Gamma \vdash t:A \quad \Gamma \vdash f:A \rightarrow (\text{Nat} \rightarrow A)}{\Gamma \vdash \text{rec}(n, t, f):A}$$

rec corresponds to **primitive recursion**

- n is a counter; t is the base (zero) case; f is the recursive step

Natural Numbers - Examples

Test for zero:

$$\lambda x^{\text{Nat}}.\text{rec}(x, \text{True}, \lambda z^{\text{Bool}}.\lambda z'^{\text{Nat}}.\text{False})$$

Plus:

$$\lambda x^{\text{Nat}}.\lambda y^{\text{Nat}}.\text{rec}(x, y, \lambda z^{\text{Nat}}.\lambda z'^{\text{Nat}}.\text{succ } z)$$

Predecessor (with zero mapped to zero):

$$\lambda x^{\text{Nat}}.\text{rec}(x, \text{zero}, \lambda z^{\text{Nat}}.\lambda z'^{\text{Nat}}.z')$$

Factorial (definition of `multiply` : `Nat` → (`Nat` → `Nat`) left as an exercise):

$$\lambda x^{\text{Nat}}.\text{rec}(x, \text{suc zero}, \lambda z^{\text{Nat}}.\lambda z'^{\text{Nat}}.\text{multiply } z (\text{suc } z'))$$

Natural Numbers - Reduction

Beta rules (we will ignore other rules e.g. for the subformula property):

- $\text{rec}(\text{zero}, t, f) \mapsto t$
- $\text{rec}(\text{suc } n, t, f) \mapsto (f (\text{rec}(n, t, f))) n$

Some examples from the last slide:

- $\text{rec}(\text{zero}, \text{True}, \lambda z. \lambda z'. \text{False}) \mapsto \text{True}$
- $\text{rec}(\text{suc } n, \text{True}, \lambda z. \lambda z'. \text{False})$
 $\mapsto ((\lambda z. \lambda z'. \text{False})(\text{rec}(n, \text{True}, \lambda z. \lambda z'. \text{False})))n \mapsto^* \text{False}$
- $\lambda x. \text{rec}(\text{suc } n, \text{zero}, \lambda z. \lambda z'. z')$
 $\mapsto ((\lambda z. \lambda z'. z')(\text{rec}(n, \text{zero}, \lambda z. \lambda z'. z'))))n \mapsto^* n$

System T and Termination

We must give up at least one of the three:

- Strong normalisation
- Decidable type-checking
- Turing completeness (all terminating algorithms representable)

System T with Nat types is much more expressive than STLC but is likewise *not* Turing-complete.

Ackermann's function:

$$A(0, n) = n+1; A(m+1, 0) = A(m, 1); A(m+1, n+1) = A(m, A(m+1, n))$$

- Expressible in the untyped lambda calculus but not in System T.

Extending System T to Turing Completeness

To make System T a universal model of computation we need to strengthen the notion of recursion, and give up strong normalisation.

This is a perfectly sensible thing to do for a programming language but destroys the formal relationship with logic.

- *All* types are inhabited by programs that fail to terminate;
- So the corresponding logic is inconsistent.
- However as long as we attempt to write terminating programs only, we can take inspiration from Curry-Howard even in a Turing complete language;
- Indeed this has been a major source of design ideas for real programming languages.

Dependency

In the STLC and System T there is one sort of variable:


- Variables **appear in** terms; and can be **replaced by** terms
- We could say that **terms** depend on (unknown) **terms**.

But there are three other options that could be considered:

- Terms depend on types;
- Types depend on terms;
- Types depend on types

Each option supports different programming paradigms, and relates via Curry-Howard to different notions of logic.

The Lambda Cube



Indeed these three approaches to variables can be combined in various ways.

We will start with $\lambda 2$ a.k.a. **System F**

- For the programmer, **parametric polymorphism**
- For the logician, **second-order propositional logic**

Diagram c/o [joomy on Twitter](#)

Types and Terms of System F

Given a set of **type variables** X, Y, \dots

- Type variables are types
- If A and B are types then so is $A \rightarrow B$
- If A is a type then so is $\Pi X. A$. Note that Π binds its variable

Hence extend STLC with new term-formers, and typing rules:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t:A}{\Gamma \vdash \Lambda X. t: \Pi X. A} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t: \Pi X. A}{\Gamma \vdash tB: A[B/X]}$$

The Λ rule is only permitted if X does not appear as a free variable in any type in Γ .

An Example

$\prod X. X \rightarrow X$ is a closed type of 'functions $X \rightarrow X$ for any X '

So it should be inhabited by a **polymorphic identity function**

- Clearly superior to individually defining functions for each type

$$\frac{\frac{x:X \vdash x:X}{\vdash \lambda x^X. x : X \rightarrow X}}{\vdash \Lambda X. \lambda x^X. x : \prod X. X \rightarrow X}$$

To turn it into an identity function that can be used at some specific type A we write

$$\vdash (\Lambda X. \lambda x^X. x) A : A \rightarrow A$$

Reduction for System F

Along with the usual beta-reduction we have

- $(\Lambda X.t)A \mapsto t[A/X]$

The substitution will only effect the type annotations in terms

- Which we sometimes omit
- e.g. $(\Lambda X.\lambda x^X.x)A \mapsto \lambda x^A.x$

All desirable properties proved for our weaker systems continue to hold

Note that real polymorphic languages e.g. Haskell tend to use type variables but often omit Λ

- Λ always implicitly at the outermost level

Encodings in System F

Chapter 11 of 'Proofs and Types' show that System F is powerful enough to encode many useful types

- Booleans, Products, Sums, Empty type;
- Existential Type (of which more soon);
- Natural numbers, Lists, Trees, inductively defined types more generally...

But polymorphism is not the only way to get access to the ability to define one's own types

- The most natural approach is to develop STLC in another direction: 'Types depend on types'
- In this setting e.g. Lists depend on their base type

Curry-Howard for System F

System F has an operator that binds variables at the type level

- As do all the extensions in the lambda cube, in fact

Via Curry-Howard, we would like to relate this to connectives that bind variables in propositions.

We indeed know two such connectives: \forall and \exists

- So all the extensions in the lambda cube relate to some sort of quantifier:

Terms depend on types

Second order quantification

Types depend on terms

First order quantification

Types depend on types

Higher order quantification

Second Order \forall

Second order (propositional) logic has formulae $\forall X.A$ where X is understood to be an **arbitrary proposition**

- *Not* an arbitrary element of some domain of elements – that is *first* order

So e.g. $\forall X.X \rightarrow X$ is a theorem

- ‘For any proposition X we have $X \rightarrow X$ ’

$\forall X.X \vee \neg X$ is not a theorem, but nor is it a contradiction

- We are still working in intuitionistic logic, albeit in powerful extensions!
- We could take this as an assumption to prove certain things

What About Second Order \exists ?

Is there an analogue of second order \exists that is useful for programming?

Yes!

- Existential types correspond to **abstract data types**.
- Symbol usually written Σ
- By asserting a type exists, but not committing to what it is, we can work (from the outside) with something without caring about its internal representation.

Example: heterogenous lists

- Usual polymorphic lists can only be instantiated to contain data of one type;
- But (assuming we have a polymorphic list constructor) `List($\Sigma X.X$)` is a list of values that each have some type; each type might be different!

Quantifiers in Intuitionistic Logic

Stepping back to the BHK Interpretation:

- A proof of $\forall x : ? . A$ is a construction that transforms a proof of $a \in ?$ into a proof of $A[a/x]$
- A proof of $\exists x : ? . A$ is given by providing $a \in ?$, and a proof of $A[a/x]$

The $?$ depends on which sort of logic we are doing

- Left out when I want to be vague, or it is clear from context
- Second order: $?$ is the set of propositions

So proofs of \forall propositions are functions, and of \exists propositions are pairs

- E.g. $\Sigma X . X$ is a pair of a type, and an element of that type
- Programming: usually written $\Pi x : ? . A$ and $\Sigma x : ? . A$
- But sometimes $(x : ?) \rightarrow A$ and $(x : ?) \times A$

Constructive \exists

Defining \exists via pairs creates another difference with classical logic.

- $\exists x:A \Leftrightarrow \neg(\forall x.\neg A)$ and $\forall x.A \Leftrightarrow \neg(\exists x:\neg A)$ fail
- Analogous to failure of e.g. $A \wedge B \Leftrightarrow \neg(\neg A \vee \neg B)$

The impossibility of a certain construction *failing* to exist does not intuitionistically imply that the construction *does* exist.

- We need to provide the element a , *then* prove it has property $A[a/x]$
- To prove an irrational number exists, it is *not* enough to prove that not all real numbers can be rational; an example of an irrational number must be given.
- This is the heart of **constructive proof**.
- A constructive proof of an existential can be used as an algorithm: it tells you how to generate the element that has the desired property.

Dependent Types

Types depend on terms

- Corresponds to **typed** first order logic
- We do not merely write $\forall x. B$, but instead $\forall x:A. B$
- So the elements used to instantiate variables are proofs / programs.

The proof / typing rules resemble those of propositional logic:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x:A \vdash t:B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x^A. t : \Pi x:A. B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \Pi x:A. B \quad \Gamma \vdash u:A}{\Gamma \vdash tu : B[u/x]}$$

Dependent Types for Theorem Checking

Dependent types are the central technology behind many (not all!) **interactive theorem provers / proof assistants**

- Coq, Lean, Agda, Idris, etc...
- Dependent types key, but actually at top right of the lambda cube
- The most spectacular and useful application of Curry-Howard
- Types can express propositions (e.g. mathematically meaningful statements), and programs are proofs of them
- If a program **type-checks** (done automatically) then it is correct!
- **Machine-checked** (not usually machine-generated) mathematics.

Some Special Dependent Types

Predicate logic often includes **identity** / equality as a connective

- In dependent type theory we have for any type A , and any two terms t and u of that type, a type $t =_A u$. Note that this type depends on terms!
- The type $t =_A t$ is always inhabited; its introduction is called refl_t

We usually blur the distinction between types and terms via special types called **universes**, which are collections of types.

- Not all terms are types, but *all types are terms*, i.e. `Bool` is a term of type `Type`, so is `Bool × Nat`, etc.
- More than one universe is necessary because `Type : Type` causes Girard's paradox; as with the similar Russell's paradox, solve with a hierarchy of types

Dependent Types in Action

Let's try to prove a simple mathematical statement:

There is no largest natural number

First, let us rephrase our statement without negation to give a more constructive proof:

- For every natural number n there exists a natural number m such that $m > n$
- I.e. we will construct a term of type $\prod n : \text{Nat} . \Sigma m : \text{Nat} . m > n$
- We must give an algorithm that, given any n , constructs this m *and* proves it has the property that it is bigger than n
- For our first task, we will simply use $\text{succ } n$. But how should the second task, the proof, look?

Dependent Types in Action: \gt

If $\prod n : \text{Nat} . \Sigma m : \text{Nat} . m \gt n$ is to make sense, $m \gt n$ must be a type

- The collection of proofs that m is greater than n
- *Not* an element of `Bool`

Assuming we have some machinery in our language to define inductive types:

- $\vdash _ \gt _ : \text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Type}$
- $(\text{zero} \gt n) := \emptyset$
- $(\text{succ } m \gt n) := (m =_{\text{Nat}} n) + (m \gt n)$
- (this $+$ is 'or', not addition)

Dependent Types in Action

Given

- $(\text{succ } m > n) := (m =_{\text{Nat}} n) + (m > n)$

we can prove $\text{succ } m > m$:

- $m : \text{Nat} \vdash \iota^1 \text{refl}_m : \text{succ } m > m$

And can hence prove our target theorem:

$$\vdash \lambda^{\text{Nat}} x. \langle \text{succ } x, \iota^1 \text{refl}_x \rangle : \prod n : \text{Nat}. \Sigma m : \text{Nat}. m > n$$

So the Curry-Howard isomorphism has been used to prove a real statement of mathematics, in a style a computer could check!

Next steps: Exploring the Theory

- [Proofs and Types](#) by Girard
- Much more in-depth: [Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism](#) by Sørensen and Urzyczyn
- Follow citations from [Propositions as Types](#) by Wadler
- Look at some of my work on links between type theory and *modal* logic: [Fitch-Style Modal Lambda-Calculi](#), or [Modal Dependent Type Theory and Dependent Right Adjoints](#)
- Category theory is the inescapable mathematics behind almost all of the mathematics of type theory

Next steps: Curry-Howard in Practice

Get started with [Coq](#), or [Lean](#), or [Agda](#), or [Idris](#)!

Multiple members of ANU's [Foundations Cluster](#) ready to supervise projects on theorem provers based on Curry-Howard

- As well as experts on theorem provers based on Higher Order Logic

Any More Questions?

And...

Thanks for your time!